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One striking phenomenon in the U.S. labor market is the reversal of the gender
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by gender. We ﬁnd that the increase in the relative earnings between college
and high school individuals and the increasing parental education have important
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11 Introduction
One striking phenomenon in the U.S. labor market is the reversal of the gender gap
in college attainment. In 1980, 57 percent of young men aged 25 to 34, as compared with
46 percent of young women, had some college education by age 34. By 1996, however,
female college attainment had reached 64 percent, 5 percentage points higher than that
of males in the same cohort. In fact, females overtook males in college attainment in
1987 and have led ever since.
There is a large body of empirical research that emphasizes the role of the earnings
premium as a key explanatory variable for the determination of education outcomes (see,
for example, Becker 1967; Mincer 1974; and Willis and Rosen 1979). In addition, an
extensive literature shows that family background is an important determinant of the
schooling decision (see, among others, Kane 1994; Cameron and Heckman 1998, 2001;
Eckstein and Wolpin 1999; and Ge 2008). Recently there have been several papers that
argue, empirically and theoretically, that expected marriage is important in determining
schooling decision (e.g., Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss 2006; and Ge 2008).
Based on this literature, we construct a formal economic model that includes the
potential costs and beneﬁts from the labor market and marriage market which determine
individual college decisions. In our model, individuals with diﬀering learning abilities
ﬁrst decide whether or not to enter college. Then they might get married and have
children. Parents are altruistic and value their children’s learning ability, which increases
with the parents’ education. Forward-looking individuals take into account the impact
of their own schooling on their children’s learning ability. Other factors that aﬀect an
individual’s decision on whether to pursue higher education include the expected direct
labor market returns to college over one’s lifetime, the expected marriage market returns
to college, and the costs in eﬀort to attend college. These costs and beneﬁts can diﬀer
by gender.
2We estimate the parameters of the model by matching data on aggregate college
attainment and college attainment conditional on parents’ education by gender from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We present evidence on how well the
model ﬁts the data. We then use the parameter estimates to simulate counterfactual
experiments, which break down the sources of changes in college attainment into the
eﬀects of changes in relative earnings, changes in parental education, and changes in the
marriage market.
We calculate marriage distributions by education, lifetime earnings by education and
marital status, and parents’ education distributions as exogenous inputs of the model.
In the marriage market, there has been a substantial decline of marriage rates for both
genders, regardless of college attainment status. In addition, the probability of marrying
a college spouse, regardless of one’s own education level, has increased over time for males
and decreased for females. Lifetime earnings by cohort are decreasing slowly for males of
all marital statuses, especially for married males. Lifetime earnings for married females
are increasing gradually, while those for single females are decreasing. We observe that
the number of college-educated parents increases over time. To formally endogenize
those changes is beyond the scope of our paper. We instead focus on the mechanism in
which, under perfect foresight, these changes aﬀect education decisions.
What accounts for the increase in college attainment over the past few decades? We
ﬁnd that the increasing gap in earnings between college and high school graduates has
important eﬀects on the increase in college attainment for both genders. When earnings
are ﬁxed at 1980 levels, attainment rates in 1996 drop by 15.5 and 17.4 percentage points
for males and females, respectively. We also emphasize the importance of intergenera-
tional persistence in schooling on the increase in college attainment for both genders. If
the parents’ schooling distribution is ﬁxed at its 1980 level, college attainments in 1996
drop by 7.8 and 7.0 percentage points for males and females. The model endogenously
3generates the pattern that a college-educated parent is substantially more likely to have
a college-educated daughter or son than a noncollege graduate, even after controlling for
the education of the other parent. This link between parents’ and children’s schooling
provides an intergenerational propagation mechanism: as the number of college-educated
parents increases, their children become more likely to attend college. Thus, the grad-
ual transformation of parental education acts as a mechanism to propagate changes in
college attainment.
What accounts for females in the last generation overtaking males in college at-
tainment? We ﬁnd that decreasing marriage rates are crucial in explaining the relative
increase in female college attainment. Under our parameters, the decline in the marriage
rate decreases returns to college for females less than those for males. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, college attainment rate of females declines less than that of males. Without the
observed changes in marriage rates, females’ college attainment would have been always
lower than that of males. Two factors are relevant here. First, among married persons,
the returns to college education are higher for males than those for females. Second,
among singles, the return to college education is higher for females than for males. As
marriage rates decrease, the returns to college for single females become high enough
to compensate for the low returns to college for married females, and female college
enrollment exceeds that of males.
This paper contributes to an active and growing literature on gender diﬀerences in
educational attainment. Several papers have studied college enrollment and graduation
by gender for one cohort. Averett and Burton (1996) focus on the gender diﬀerences in
college enrollment for young individuals in 1979. Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2002)
construct a model to explain why males had higher college attainment than females
in the 1970s. Jacob (2002) ﬁnds that higher noncognitive skills and college premiums
among women account for most of the gender gap in higher education enrollment in
41988. Those papers focus only on one cohort and thus cannot examine the trends.
Among works that study the reversal of the gender gap in higher education enrollment
over time, Anderson (2002) suggests that increasing discount rates over time have a role
in explaining the gender gap in college enrollment. Charles and Luoh (2003) emphasize
the eﬀect of the uncertainty of future wages on relative schooling by gender. Those
papers do not consider the eﬀects of marriage and children on college entry decisions.
Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2006) show, in a theoretical framework, that women
can acquire more schooling than men if the gender wage gap narrows with the level of
education. One crucial assumption of their model is that the intramarital share of the
marriage surplus one can extract increases with his or her education. Our results do
not rely on this assumption. To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst that incorporates
several factors in a structural model to quantitatively account for the gender gap in
college attainment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some empirical results
from the PSID documenting college attainment rates in 1980–1996. In Section 3, we
present our model. Section 4 provides parameters estimated from the data that are
used in the model. Section 5 presents the quantitative results of the benchmark model
and investigates the quantitative importance of changes in relative earnings, changes in
parental education, and changes in the marriage market. Section 6 conducts sensitivity
analysis. Brief concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
2 Data on College Attainment
We use the PSID to calculate college attainment rates. The PSID is a longitudinal
survey of U.S. families and the individuals who make up those families. We select
individuals in the core sample whose ages were between 25–34 in that year and who had
5valid information on parents’ education.1 We use completed schooling among mature
adults as the measure of an individual’s schooling.2 An individual who has more than
12 years of education completed by age 34 is deﬁned as having a college education.
The college attainment rate is calculated as the fraction of individuals that have college
education among each speciﬁc group.














Figure 1: College attainment rates by age 34 among those aged 25–34.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the PSID data ﬁles.
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in relative college attainment by males and females
over the sample period considered here, 1980 to 1996.3 Among those whose ages were
between 25 and 34 in 1980, 57 percent of young men had some college education, which
was 11 percentage points higher than young women. By 1996, male college attainment
rate had increased slightly by 2 percentage points, while female college attainment had
increased by 18 percentage points. In fact females have led males in college attainment
1We thus use the average college attainment of 10 birth cohorts. The sample size in the PSID is too
small for us to analyze each birth cohort.
2See Charles and Luoh (2003) for a discussion of the advantage of using school attainment among
mature adults over enrollment.
3We choose this beginning period to avoid the high male-to-female ratio in the early 70s after the
Vietnam War. We choose this ending period because of the availability of data. The latest year of data
available to us is 2005 PSID. Since we use education completed by age 34, individuals at the age of 34
in 2005 were 25 in 1996. For the years 1997 and later, of course, education by age 34 is not available
for individuals at age 25.
6since 1987.4, 5













Figure 2: Female college attainment rates conditional on parental education.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the PSID data ﬁles. h denotes high school and below, and
c denotes some college and above.
We also calculate college attainment rates conditional on parents’ education. A
detailed description of the data processing procedure is provided in Appendix 8.1. Figure
2 shows female college attainment conditional on parental education. We observe that a
college-educated parent is substantially more likely to have a college-educated daughter
than a noncollege-educated parent, even after controlling for the education of the other
parent.6 For example, among those who were in the age range of 25 to 34 in 1980, 84
percent of females whose parents both had a college education had attended some college,
which was 5 percentage points higher than those whose father had a college education
but whose mother did not, and 20 percentage points higher than those whose mother
had a college education but whose father did not. Therefore, the marginal eﬀect of a
father’s education on his children’s education is larger than that of a mother’s. We also
observe that the conditional attainment rates increase at a much slower pace than the
4Other studies (see, for example, Charles and Luoh 2003; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006), which
use diﬀerent measures of education or diﬀerent data sets, ﬁnd similar patterns.
5The sample size in PSID is too small if we divide the sample by race/ethnicity. The process of
convergence and ultimate ascendancy by women in completed schooling among successive generations
of men and women is evident, however, when we divide sample by race/ethnicity using the CPS.
6Similar patterns hold for sons, and the results are available from the authors upon request.
7aggregate attainment rates. This indicates that a large fraction of the observed increase
in female attainment can be accounted for by the increase in their parents’ attainment.













Figure 3: Parents’ education distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the PSID data ﬁles.
The schooling distribution of our PSID sample’s parents is shown in Figure 3. We
observe that the number of college-educated parents increases over time. In 1980, 12
percent of individuals ages 25–34 had parents that both had college educations, and 69
percent had parents that both had only high school educations or below. By 1996, the
fractions have changed to 23 percent and 50 percent.
3 The Model
The economy is populated by individuals that live for two periods. We assume that
going to college entails an idiosyncratic nonpecuniary eﬀort cost D ∈ [0,∞).7 In each
period, the adult population is characterized by a distribution of eﬀort costs. At the
beginning of the ﬁrst period, individuals with diﬀerent costs make schooling decisions.
7We can interpret the eﬀort cost as net of the psychic beneﬁt of attending college. Heterogeneity in
eﬀort cost in our model is equivalent to heterogeneity in the consumption value of school in the literature
(Keane and Wolpin 1997, 2001; Eckstein and Wolpin 1999; and Ge 2008). These papers consider the
lifecycle decisions of one cohort. They normally allow individual heterogeneity in other dimensions, for
example, diﬀerent wage oﬀers. However, Ge (2008) shows that heterogeneity in the consumption value
of school is the most important determinant of women’s college enrollment decision.
8In the second period, they might get married and have children. Parents are altruistic
and care about their children’s learning ability. We assume that the higher a parent’s
education, the higher is his or her children’s learning ability. Factors that aﬀect an
individual’s decision on whether to attend college include the direct labor market returns
to college and the marriage market returns to college, the impact of one’s own schooling
on his or her children’s learning ability, as well as the eﬀort cost. These costs and beneﬁts
can diﬀer by gender. We now describe the model in more detail.
3.1 Marriage and the Labor Market (Second Period)
In the second period, individuals of schooling type sf and sm might marry at an
exogenously given rate, and they work.8 We denote the education of a male as sm =
{0,1,2} and the education of a female as sf = {0,1,2}, where 0 stands for that person
being absent, 1 stands for being a high school graduate, and 2 stands for having a college
education. Let Yg,sm,sf denote the earnings, net of monetary costs of attending college,
of an individual of gender g = {f,m}, male’s education = sm, and female’s education =
sf. For example, Yf,0,2 denotes the earnings of a single female with a college education,
and Yf,2,2 denotes the earnings of a female with a college education whose spouse has a
college education.
Each individual values his or her own consumption and children’s learning ability,
if that person has children. We abstract from out-of-wedlock birth and assume that a
single individual does not have children.9 If a person does not marry, that person enjoys
the full beneﬁts of his or her own earnings. The person also gains or loses utility from
the status of being single. The lifetime utility functions for a single female and a single
8For simplicity’s sake, we do not model marriage as a match outcome. Fernandez, Guner, and
Knowles (2005) study the interactions between household matching, inequality, and per capita income.
9Allowing single individuals to have children would signiﬁcantly complicate our analysis, as it is hard
to measure directly the eﬀect of the absent parent on the children’s education outcome.
9male of schooling level s are, respectively,
U
f (sm = 0,sf = s) = log(Yf,0,s) + δ, (1)
U
m (sm = s,sf = 0) = log(Ym,s,0) + δ, (2)
where δ is the additional value from being single, which can be negative or positive.
Let’s take the case of married couple with children. We assume that fertility is ex-
ogenous and the total number of children a couple has is independent of each spouse’s
education.10 The cost of having children as the opportunity cost of time will be incor-
porated into our estimates of the earnings process. We abstract from the ﬁnancial cost
of raising children.
The learning ability of the couple’s children, a0, is a function of the couple’s human








This functional form captures the fact that when parents are more educated, their chil-
dren tend to have high learning ability. This could occur because more educated parents
provide a better environment for children to ﬂourish, or because parental learning ability
is passed on genetically (Plug and Vijverberg 2003). Children of diﬀerent genders from
the same family have the same learning ability.
Each spouse gets a share of the total family income, with the weight of each spouse
depending on his or her individual relative earnings through a parameter λ ∈ [0,1]. The
income share of the wife is (1 − λ)0.5 + λYf,sm,sf/(Ym,sm,sf + Yf,sm,sf), and the share of
the husband is (1−λ)0.5+λYm,sm,sf/( Ym,sm,sf + Yf,sm,sf). Notice that λ = 0 is the case
10Fernandez and Rogerson (1998), Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2002), and Greenwood, Guner,
and Knowles (2003) show that fertility declines with income and education. Adopting the assumption
that fertility declines with education should only change the results marginally since in our model an
individual’s decision is not aﬀected by the number of children.
10of full income-pooling, while λ ∈ (0,1] implies that each spouse’s share of household
earnings increases with his or her own earnings.
The utilities of men and women of marriage type (sm,sf) are given, respectively, as
U




m(sm,sf) = log[0.5((1 + λ)Ym,sm,sf + (1 − λ)Yf,sm,sf)] + λa log[a
0
sm,sf], (5)
where λa measures the weight on the utility from children’s learning ability.11
3.2 The College Decision (First Period)
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, an individual decides whether to go to college
or not. A female individual chooses whether to attend college, sf = 1 (high school)
and sf = 2 (college), given her conditional marriage probabilities Pf (sm|sf) and her










f(sm,sf = 2)Pf (sm|sf = 2) − D
o
.
Note that Pf (0|sf) is the probability of being single. A male’s problem is deﬁned
analogously.
An individual is indiﬀerent as to whether he or she goes to college or not if the
expected utility gain from going to college is equal to the eﬀort cost D. We deﬁne the
11An alternative speciﬁcation of altruism is to use a dynastic model. This would complicate our
analysis signiﬁcantly because the environment is not stationary. Thus we use children’s learning abil-
ity to approximate their expected lifetime utility. Learning ability is an important component of an
individual’s endowments when the college entry decision is made. As is shown in Keane and Wolpin
























m(sm = 1,sf)Pm (sf|sm = 1). (8)
Therefore a female with an idiosyncratic eﬀort cost D chooses to go to college, sf = 2,
if and only if D < D∗
f, and a male chooses sm = 2 if and only if D < D∗
m.
3.3 Distribution
Each individual receives a draw of eﬀort cost, D, in the ﬁrst period. We assume
that the individual’s learning ability, a, aﬀects the distribution of eﬀort cost from which
he or she draws. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the eﬀort cost D is log-normally
distributed with mean µ(a) and variance σ2, where µ(a) is decreasing in the learning
ability level a. Recall from Equation (3) that a is determined by parent’s type, asm−1,sf−1,
where sj−1 is parent j’s schooling. In each period, there are 4 diﬀerent values of a. Let
ψc
g(sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j) denote the college attainment rates of individuals of gender g,
conditional on parents’ education, which are calculated using cumulative distribution




g(sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j) = F[D
∗
g|ai,j].
Notice that the fraction of individuals that go to college will depend on the parents’ type,
because the parents’ type determines the average eﬀort cost these individuals bear.




sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j
￿
as the fraction of fathers and mothers with education level i
and j, respectively. Thus the aggregate college attainment, Φc
g, is the average of the








g(sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j) ∗ p−1
￿




We calculate parents’ education distributions, marriage distributions, and lifetime
earnings as inputs of the model. We compute the distribution of parents’ education
from the PSID. The results were presented in Section 2. Since the Current Population
Surveys (CPS) cover longer periods and have a larger sample than the PSID, we use
the CPS to estimate earnings and marriage distributions.12 This section describes the
estimation procedure and results of those parameters in detail.
4.1 Marriage Distributions
We estimate the probability that each individual will be married from the March
supplement of the CPS 1964–2007. We deﬁne an individual as having a college education
if he or she completes more than 12 years of schooling.13 To be consistent with our model,
we exclude individuals whose marital status is that of widowed, divorced, or separated.
Individuals in our sample are either never married or currently married. We deﬁne an
individual as single if he or she has never married.
For each birth cohort, we ﬁrst construct a pseudo-panel of people between the ages
of 18 and 65. In each pseudo-panel we construct, we calculate the life-cycle proﬁle of
marriage rate, which is deﬁned as the fraction of individuals that are married at each age.
12The PSID and the CPS show similar patterns of college attainment.
13The CPS changed schooling classiﬁcation in 1992. Prior to 1991, we have information on the number
of grades attended and completed up to 18 years. After 1992, information on an individual’s highest
degree received was provided. We classify those who have some college but no degree, and those who
have bachelor’s degrees and above as being college educated.
13Usually not the entire life-cycle proﬁle is observed.14 We use a fourth-order polynomial
in age to estimate the life-cycle proﬁle. Then we pick the predicted probability of being
married at age 35 (38) as a proxy of the average lifetime marriage probability for a
typical female (male).15 For each year between 1980 and 1996, we compute the average
marriage rate of these cohorts who were between the ages of 25 and 34 in that year.
Figure 4 shows marriage rate by gender and education. For a male, having attained
the level of college implies a higher probability of being married than if one had not.
For a female, having attended college implies a lower probability of marriage before
1990 and a higher probability after 1990. Figure 4 also shows that there has been a
substantial decline in marriage rates for both genders. From 1980 to 1996 the marriage
rate decreased by 18 percentage points for high school males, 13 percentage points for
college males, 15 percentage points for high school females, and 10 percentage points for
college females.16
We assume the decrease in marriage rates is exogenous. Stevenson and Wolfers
(2007) review the potential reasons to explain the changes in marriage rates. Greater
access to birth control and abortion might reduce marriage (Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz
1996; Goldin and Katz 2002). Labor-saving technology might decrease the return to
be gotten from specialization within a household. Increasing wage inequality might
increase the time needed to search within the marriage market (Gould and Paserman
2003). Education might delay marriage; thus we choose to measure marriage rate at
late ages. In this paper we focus on how future expected marriage rate aﬀects education
decisions, when individuals take into account that going to college will change their
14For example, for a cohort born in 1970, the available CPS data only provide us with a marriage
rate proﬁle from ages 18 to 37.
15We thus capture the pattern that males usually marry later than females.
16The marriage rate for males is lower than that for females for each cohort. This does not indicate
that the marriage market is not clear at each point in time. Since males marry three years later than
females, at each point in time, males marry females three cohorts younger. Shifting males’ proﬁles by
three years to the right reduces most of the diﬀerences in marriage rates by gender.
14future perspective on marriage.
We then calculate, conditional on being married, the probability of marrying each
type of spouse. We use household and spousal identiﬁcation information to match cou-
ples. For the years from 1980 to 1996, we compute the marriage distribution of those
married individuals who were between the ages of 25 and 34 in each year.















Figure 4: Marriage rates for individuals ages
25 to 34 by gender and education
















Figure 5: Probability of marrying a college-
educated spouse conditional on own gender
and education
Figure 5 conﬁrms the well-known phenomenon that people do not marry randomly
and there exists assortative matching (Becker 1973; Mare 1991; and Pencavel 1998).17
A college-educated person is more likely to marry a college-educated spouse and ben-
eﬁt from the spouse’s earnings. Meanwhile, Figure 5 shows that as the female college
attainment rate increases, the probability of marrying a college female for a male, with
or without college education, increases over time.
4.2 Earnings
We need to estimate expected lifetime earnings at each marriage status for an in-
dividual at the beginning of the life cycle. We do not observe wages for those who do
17Benham (1974), Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984), Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1994), and
Weiss (1997) point out that one’s own schooling can improve spousal schooling acquired in the marriage
market, but it is diﬃcult to conclude whether this eﬀect is due to human capital accumulation within
the household or assortative mating.
15not work, since there are none. If labor force participation is correlated with unob-
servable determinants of wages, a simple OLS regression is biased. To control for the
selection bias, we estimate the wage by a two-stage procedure: First we estimate equa-
tions of observed labor market participation as functions of explanatory variables along
with random disturbance terms representing unobservable factors. Then we specify and
estimate equations of the logarithm of wage, controlling for participation selection.
4.2.1 Estimation Procedure
We estimate a regression function for each subsample of working individuals by gen-
der as
logwi = Xiβ + αVi + ηi, (11)
where logwi is the logarithm of real hourly wage and X is a vector of characteristics such
as schooling, work experience, etc. The variable V , the inverse Mills ratio, represents
the selection eﬀect of participation.
We apply the Heckman (1979) and Lee (1978) two-stage estimation methods to this
model to obtain consistent estimates. First, we estimate equations linking observed
labor market participation to a set of explanatory variables and a random disturbance
terms representing unobservable factors.18 Second, we use these estimates to construct
the inverse Mills ratios for the wage equation. Then, we run an OLS regression of log
wage equations on X, using the estimated inverse Mills ratios as additional regressors, as
is speciﬁed in Equation (11). Finally, we predict hourly wage for each individual using
18The standard procedure for ensuring identiﬁcation is to have this set of variables not be identical
to X. In our speciﬁcation, the number of children is assumed to aﬀect the participation decision, but
not wages directly.
16the ﬁtted equation:
log b wi = Xib β, (12)
where b β is the consistent estimation of β. The estimation results, along with a full
description of our methodology, are provided in Appendix 8.2.
4.2.2 Lifetime Earnings
The earnings concept that is consistent with our model is the expected lifetime
earnings. To calculate the lifetime earnings, ﬁrst we use the following procedure to
estimate the average life-cycle proﬁles of earnings from the CPS. For a typical individual
who is in birth cohort t, with gender g = {f,m}, education of the husband sm = {0,1,2},
and education of the wife sf = {0,1,2}, we denote earnings at age age as yt
g,sm,sf(age).
For each birth cohort t, we ﬁrst construct a pseudo-panel between ages 18 and 65. Then
yt
g,sm,sf(age) is calculated as the product of mean predicted hourly wages (as in Equation
[12]) and mean annual hours worked by that particular gender, education, marital status,
age, and cohort. We then use a polynomial in age, age, to estimate the life-cycle earnings








where I(cohort = t) is a dummy for birth cohort t.
We calculate total lifetime earnings by gender, marital status, and cohort using the
estimated life-cycle earnings proﬁles described in Equation (13). For a male who is in
birth cohort t, with education of the husband sm = {0,1,2} and education of the wife
sf = {0,1,2}, we calculate total discounted life-cycle earnings at the beginning of his

































t(age), if sm = c,
where r is the annual real interest rate, cst(age) is the annual cost of college for cohort
t at age age, which, including tuition, room and board, and yt
m,sm,sf (age), is the annual
real earnings at age age = {18,19,...,65} as given by Equation (13).19 A female’s
lifetime earnings are calculated analogously. An interest rate of r = 4% is used. We set
the annual cost of college based on the estimates from the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES, Digest of Education Statistics, 2004, Table 313).
For the years from 1980 to 1996, we compute the average discounted life-cycle earn-
ings of those cohorts aged 25–34 in each year, by gender and marriage type. Figure
6 shows lifetime earnings for males at each marriage status. We observe that high
school graduates on average have much less earnings than college graduates, regardless
of marriage status. We also notice that married males on average earn more than never-
married ones do. The marriage premium is the highest for those whose spouses have
college degrees. Over time, lifetime earnings by cohort are decreasing slowly for males
at all marital statuses, especially for married males.20
Figure 7 shows lifetime earnings for females at each marriage status. We observe
that high school graduates on average have much less earnings than college graduates,
regardless of marriage status. However, we do not ﬁnd that married females–unlike
males–earn more than singles. The marriage premium for females is negligible among
high school graduates and is in fact negative among college graduates. Over time, lifetime
19We assume college students cannot work, thus do not have earnings between the ages of 18 and 21.
20Our ﬁnding is consistent with Kambourov and Manovskii (2005), who show that the life-cycle
proﬁles of males’ earnings for younger cohorts are lower than those for older cohorts.
18earnings for married females are increasing gradually, partially because of the increasing
female labor supply, partially the increasing of wages. On the contrary, lifetime earnings
for single females are decreasing gradually, since the increase of wages is oﬀset by the
decrease of labor supply.21 Compared with lifetime earnings for males shown in Figure 6,
females earn much less than males of the same marital status. The diﬀerences in earnings
between married males and married females are decreasing gradually over time.


















Figure 6: Male’s lifetime earnings
Source: Authors’ estimation from the CPS
data ﬁles.


















Figure 7: Female’s lifetime earnings
Source: Authors’ estimation from the CPS
data ﬁles.
The increase in the lifetime earnings of married females across cohorts is caused by
the increase in female labor supply and the decrease in the gender wage gap. We do not
attempt to disentangle those two forces. Existing theories that explain the increase in
female labor participation include the following: technological innovation (Greenwood,
Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005; Goldin and Katz 2002; and Albanesi and Olivetti 2006),
falling child care costs (Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos, forthcoming), an increase
in the number of jobs that are less physically demanding (Goldin 1990), cultural accep-
tance of maternal employment (Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Fernandez 2007;
Fogli and Veldkamp 2008), and increases in women’s wages (Jones, Manuelli, and Mc-
Grattan 2003). Existing theories that explain the decrease of the gender wage gap
21Our results conﬁrm McGrattan and Rogerson (2004), who use census ﬁgures and ﬁnd a decline of
hours worked by single females.
19include gender diﬀerences in qualiﬁcations and discrimination (Blau and Kahn 2000),
and self-selection (Mulligan and Rubinstein 2007).
5 Findings
Can the model replicate the change in college attainment that occurred between 1980
and 1996? To do this, we use the data reported in Section 4 and estimate the other
model’s parameters which are constant over time by matching aggregate and conditional
college attainment rates obtained in the data. Then we run counterfactual simulations
to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent mechanisms on college attainment by comparing college
attainments from each simulation with those in the benchmark.
5.1 Benchmark
We use calculated earnings, marriage distributions, and parent education distribu-
tions as inputs of the model and estimate the rest of the parameters to match observed
aggregate and conditional attainment rates by gender. The estimated parameters are
presented in Table 1. We ﬁnd that λ = 0, indicating that each spouse consumes half
of the household earnings. The preference parameter δ is positive, indicating that the
status of being single brings additional utility. The ability production parameter θs is
less than 0.5, indicating that fathers’ education aﬀects children’s learning ability more
than mothers’ education, consistent with Figure 2, where the marginal eﬀect of fathers’
education on children’s education is larger than that of mothers’.22 The fact that θs is
less than 0.5 implies the following order of learning ability levels by parents’ education:
a1,1 < a1,2 < a2,1 < a2,2. This in turn implies that the eﬀort cost distribution parameters
by parents’ education µi,j = µ(ai,j) have a corresponding rank order. In particular, since
µ(a) is decreasing in a, we have µ1,1 > µ1,2 > µ2,1 > µ2,2.
22This is also consistent with the empirical results of Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002).
20Parameters Estimates
Preference λa = 2.023,λ = 0,δ = 1.005
Ability production θs = 0.425
Eﬀort cost distributions
Means µ1,1 = 0.257, µ2,1 = 0.077
µ1,2 = 0.137, µ2,2 = −0.006
Standard Deviation σ = 0.191
Table 1: Parameters used in the benchmark model
Figure 8 compares college attainment rates from the model with those in the data.
The model is able to generate the pattern that college attainments for females were
lower in 1980 and higher in 1996 than those for males, as is observed in the data. In the
model, female college attainment began to exceed that of males in 1986, one year earlier
than observed in the data.







































Figure 8: College attainment rates
Figure 9 compares females’ college attainment rates conditional on parent’s education
from the model with those in the data. The model is able to generate the pattern that a
college-educated parent is substantially more likely to have a college-educated daughter
than a parent who is a noncollege graduate, even after controlling for the education of
the other parent.23 In our model, parents’ type determines the average eﬀort cost these
individuals bear. Thus the order of µ’s, µ1,1 > µ1,2 > µ2,1 > µ2,2, is critical to generate
23Similar patterns hold for males, and the results are available from the authors upon request.
21the order of school attainment by parent’s type.









































Figure 9: Female’s college attainment rates (dashed line: data; solid line: model)
5.2 Counterfactual Simulations
In the benchmark economy, changes in college attainment over time are caused by the
exogenous changes in parental education, lifetime earnings by education, and marriage
distributions. To study the eﬀects of diﬀerent mechanisms on college attainment, we run
counterfactual simulations. For each simulation, we keep the values of the variables that
we want to focus on ﬁxed in the 1980 level, and we keep the values of other variables the
same as in the benchmark model. Therefore the comparison between each simulation
and the benchmark model results will quantify the direct eﬀects of those variables.
5.2.1 Parents’ background
First, we investigate the intergenerational schooling eﬀects. The results are shown
in Figure 10. When the parents’ schooling distribution is ﬁxed at the 1980 level, college
attainment drops by 7.8 and 7.0 percentage points in 1996 for males and females. We
notice the gender reversal of college attainment occurs in the same year as in the bench-
mark. Therefore, parental education is an important source of the increase in college
22attainment but cannot in itself account for the reversal of the gender gap.











Figure 10: No change in parents’ distribution since 1980
The benchmark model captures the intergenerational persistence in schooling: When
parents are more educated, their children tend to have high learning ability and are
more likely to go to college. Thus the gradual transformation of parental schooling
composition, as is shown in Figure 3, acts as a mechanism to propagate change in
college attainment: as the number of college-educated parents increases, so does the
proportion of children with high learning ability (a low value of the eﬀort cost D), which
then helps to increase the attainment rate of the children’s generation. This propagation
mechanism seems to aﬀect females and males in similar magnitude, so that it had little
eﬀect on the timing of gender reversal of college attainment.
These results for intergenerational schooling eﬀects are broadly consistent with pre-
vious research. Many studies report a signiﬁcant positive relationship between parents’
education and the schooling of their children for one cohort (Behrman 1997; Behrman
and Rosenzweig 2002). Based on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (NLSY79), Ge (2008) estimates a sequential college choice model and shows that
improvements in parental education can account for a large part of the college atten-
dance diﬀerence between NLSY79 young women and those born almost 20 years later.
To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst attempt to investigate the importance of inter-
23generational schooling eﬀects in accounting for the trends of college attainment for both
genders.
5.2.2 Earnings
To understand the eﬀect of earnings on education, we calculate the labor market
return to education. For singles, we compute the ratios of life-cycle earnings between
college and high school for males and females. For married couples, the relevant concept
of earnings is household lifetime earnings, since λ = 0 implies full income pooling between
spouses. For a married female (male), we compare the earnings of a household in which
the wife (husband) has a college education, but the husband (wife) does not, with the
earnings of a household in which both spouses are high school graduates.24













Figure 11: Earnings Return to College by Gender and Marital Status
Figure 11 presents the earnings return to college by gender and marital status. Sev-
eral patterns are observed over the period 1980–1996. First, the earnings return to college
increases for both genders and for all marital statuses.25 Second, the earnings return to
24We also compared earnings in households where both spouses are college graduates with earnings
in households in which the wife (husband) has a college education but the husband (wife) does not; the
returns are only slightly higher and the overtime trends are almost identical.
25Using cross-sectional earnings or wages, many authors have documented recent increases in the
earnings return to college. (See, for example, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Katz and Murphy 1992;
Card and DiNardo 2002; and Eckstein and Nagyp´ al 2004) Our measure using lifetime earnings gives
24college is higher for single females than for single males. In 1980, single college-educated
males had 59 percent more earnings than single high-school-educated males, while single
college-educated females had 91 percent more earnings than single high-school-educated
females. The earnings return to college for single females has increased more than that
for single males between 1980 and 1996. Third, the earnings return to college is similar
for married females as for married males. Compared to a typical household in 1980 in
which neither spouse attained college, a household in which the man went to college had
21 percent more earnings, while a household in which the woman went college had 22
percent more earnings.












Figure 12: No change in earnings since 1980
We now analyze the case in which there is no change in earnings since 1980. The
results are shown in Figure 12. Male and female attainment rates drop by 15.5 and 17.4
percentage points by 1996. This indicates that the increasing returns to college in the
labor market for those cohorts, as shown in Figure 11, have an important impact on
college attainment for those cohorts.
The change of earnings has a larger eﬀect on college attainment for females than
that for males. This is due to the fact that, over time, the earnings return to college for
single females has been increasing at a faster rate than that for single males. The gender
similar results.
25reversal of college attainment occurs in the same year, however, as in the benchmark
model. Thus the change in earnings over time cannot account for the reversal of the
gender gap in college attainment.26
5.2.3 Marriage market
The next two simulations try to isolate the eﬀects of changes in the marriage market
on college attainments. First, we quantify the eﬀects of declines in marriage rates,
keeping conditional marriage probabilities as in the data. Then, we show the eﬀects of
changes in conditional marriage probabilities, keeping marriage rates as in the data.
Marriage rates Figure 13 shows that, without change in the rates of marriage, both
males and females would reach higher college attainment in 1996 and females’ college
attainment would always be lower than that of males.
The decline in marriage rates decreases college attainment for both genders. This can
be explained by the diﬀerences in the total returns to education by marital status. As is
shown in Figure 11, the earnings return to college in the labor market is higher for singles
than for married couples. However, married individuals receive an additional beneﬁt
from college through increasing their children’s learning ability. Under our parameters,
the return from children for married couples dominates their lower return in the labor
market; thus the returns to college increase with marriage rate. As the marriage rate
declines, returns to college decrease and so does college attainment.
The comparison also indicates that, as marriage rates decline, female college at-
tainment decreases less than that of males. This is because single females receive a
larger return to college in the labor market than single males. Moreover, under our
parametrization, θs is less than 0.5; therefore married females receive a smaller return
26We also simulate a version that ﬁxes monetary costs of attending college at 1980 level and the
resulting attainments for both genders are very similar to the benchmark results.
26to college through their children than married males. As a result, the decline in the
marriage rate decreases the returns to college for females less than those for males.
Therefore, college attainment for females declines less than that for males. This implies
that changes in marriage rates are crucial in accounting for the reversal of the gender
gap in college attainment. In fact, Figure 13 shows that without the decline in marriage
rates, female college attainment never exceeds male attainment.













Figure 13: No change in single rates since
1980











Figure 14: No change in conditional marriage
probability since 1980
Conditional marriage probabilities In the fourth simulation we ﬁx the conditional
marriage probabilities at the level they were in 1980 and keep the marriage rates in
the data. The results are shown in Figure 14. The college attainment in 1996 would
be 4.6 and 3.3 percentage points lower for males and females, respectively. Therefore
the change of conditional marriage probabilities plays a quantitatively minor role in
accounting for the increase in college attainment for both genders.
The gender reversal of college attainment occurs at the same time as in the bench-
mark model. The change of the marriage rate has a larger eﬀect on college attainment
for males than for females. This is in part due to the fact that, over time, the proba-
bility of marrying a college spouse for males has increased quite substantially, while the
probability for females has barely changed. In our model, spousal education increases
27household income and children’s human capital. In the benchmark, over time, males
beneﬁt more from marrying college spouses than females do; thus college attainment for
males increases more than that for females.
6 Sensitivity
6.1 Transmission of ability
In the benchmark, we assume that children’s learning ability is aﬀected only by par-
ents’ education. Now we relax this assumption by also allowing for genetic transmission
of innate ability. We introduce innate ability π, and acquired learning ability a. The
acquired learning ability of a couple’s children, a0, is a function of the children’s innate
ability, π0, and the couple’s human capital, sm and sf. The production function of











We assume that there are two types of innate ability, and that there is a positive corre-
lation between parents’ and children’s innate ability.














At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, a female individual with innate ability πf chooses
whether to attend college, sf = 1 (high school) and sf = 2 (college), given her condi-



















A female individual is indiﬀerent about whether to go to college or not if the expected

















f(sm,sf = 1,πm,πf)Pf (sm,πm|sf = 1,πf),
Therefore a female with an idiosyncratic eﬀort cost D and innate ability πf chooses to go
to college, sf = 2, if and only if D < D∗
f(πf). A male’s problem is deﬁned analogously.
We assume that the eﬀort cost D is log-normally distributed with mean µ(a) and
variance σ2, where µ(a) is decreasing in the learning ability level a. In each period, there
are 8 diﬀerent values of a. Let ψc
g(sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j,π) denote the college attainment
rates of individuals of gender g, conditional on innate ability and parents’ education,









π|sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j
￿
as the fraction of individuals that have innate
ability π among those whose fathers and mothers have education levels i and j, respec-
tively. Let ψc
g(sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j) denote the college attainment rate of individuals of
29gender g, conditional on parents’ education, which is calculated as
(19) Ψ
c





g(sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j,π)∗p−1
￿
π|sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j
￿
.




sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j
￿
the fraction of individuals whose fathers and mothers have ed-
ucation level i and j, respectively. Thus the aggregate college attainment, Φc
g, is the








g(sm−1 = i,sf−1 = j) ∗ e p−1
￿







using NLSY79. The NLSY79 is a nationally represen-
tative sample of young men and women who were 14–22 years old when they were ﬁrst
surveyed in 1979. They were 25–33 in 1990. We use AFQT (Armed Force Qualiﬁcation
Test) percentile score to measure innate ability. An individual is deﬁned as having high
innate ability if his or her AFQT score is above the age-adjusted median score. The
calculated distribution of innate ability by parents’ education seems to be stationary




is stationary from 1980 to
1996.
We also assume that innate ability is an unobservable individual characteristic. This
justiﬁes the assumption that Pf (sm,πm|sf,πf) is independent of πf, and Pm (sf,πf|sm,πm)
is independent of πm. Thus Pf (sm,πm|sf,πf) = Pf (sm,πm|sf) = Pf (sm|sf) ∗ Pm (πm|sm).
We calculate Pf (πf|sf),Pm (πm|sm) from NLSY79. We assume that those distributions
are stationary from 1980 to 1996.
Table 2 compares the results of counterfactual simulations between the benchmark
and the model with innate ability. The results indicate that in the benchmark model,
which is without the intergenerational correlation of innate ability, the quantitative
30male female taken-over time
1996 attainment accounted for by (in percentage points)
1 earnings
benchmark 15.5 17.4 1988
adding innate ability 14.4 16.2 1986
2 parents’ distribution
benchmark 7.81 6.96 1986
adding innate ability 7.96 7.20 1985
3 marriage rate
benchmark -18.7 -8.30 no
adding innate ability -16.1 -7.36 no
4 conditional marriage probability
benchmark 5.62 4.63 1986
adding innate ability 3.86 3.76 1986
Table 2: Comparison of benchmark and the model with innate ability
importance of earnings, parents’ background, and marriage market on college attainment
are very similar to a model with innate ability.
6.2 Marriage rate
In the benchmark model, the decline in marriage rates is crucial in accounting for
the reversal of the gender gap in college attainment. To see how sensitive the results
to marriage rates are, we reestimate the model using marriage rates that decline less
dramatically. We assume that marriage rates decrease by 80 percent of the size as in the
benchmark every year. The results (not shown) indicate that, using marriage rates that
decline less dramatically, the quantitative importance of earnings, parents’ background,
and marriage market on college attainment is very similar to the benchmark model.
7 Conclusion
We develop a dynamic model of college entry decision that incorporates intergenera-
tional persistence on learning ability, marriage, and diﬀerential earnings by gender and
31marital status. Using this model, we study the eﬀects of changes in relative earnings,
changes in parental education, and changes in the marriage market on changes in col-
lege attainment by gender. We ﬁnd that the rises in parental education and relative
earnings between college and high school persons increase college attainment for both
genders. The declining marriage rates decrease college attainment for females less than
that for males, and thus are crucial in explaining the reversal of the gender gap in college
attainment.
There are several directions in which this work can be extended. First, we abstract
from divorce and out-of-wedlock birth and assume a single individual does not have chil-
dren. The divorce rate has been stabilized since the early 1980s but out-of-wedlock birth
has been increasing. Those changes in family structure might aﬀect female’s and male’s
college attainment decisions diﬀerently. Second, we assume earnings are exogenous. An
extension that we wish to explore is the relationship among college attainment, mar-
riage, and labor supply for both genders. Even though labor earnings are sacriﬁced, a
parent who stays at home and takes care of children would contribute to the household




The PSID is a longitudinal survey of U.S. families and the individuals who make
up those families. Approximately 4,800 U.S. families were sampled in 1968, and these
families were reinterviewed annually until 1997. From 1997 onwards PSID was changed
to a biennial data collection and two major changes were made: a reduction of the core
sample, and the addition of a new sample of post-1968 immigrant families and their
adult children.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd parents’ education for the selected sample by linking parents and chil-
dren from Individual Files (1968–2005). The PSID facilitates the intergenerational link-
age by providing the parent’s ID in the Individual Files. If a linkage can not be found in
32Individual Files, we use 2003 Parent Identiﬁcation Files to link an individual with his or
her parents. If the above procedure fails to provide parents’ education information, we
ﬁnd parents’ education by using parents’ and parents-in-law’s education as reported by
the head in Family Files. In 1974, questions were asked about how much education had
been completed by the household head’s parents and by the spouse’s parents. In the
later waves, these parental education questions were asked for new heads and spouses.
By merging Individual Files with Family Files, we are able to ﬁnd parents’ education
for those who were heads or spouses or siblings of the heads.
8.2 Estimation of wage
The model is estimated on the March CPS from 1964 to 2007. We restrict the sample
to individuals who are between the ages of 18 and 65 who are not in the armed forces and
not self-employed. To be consistent with the decision model, we restrict our attention to
individuals who are either married or single (never married). Hourly wage is deﬂated to
2006 dollars using the CPI. Deﬁnitions of variables are given in Appendix section 8.2.2.
We run separate probit wage selection and log wage regression for each gender in each
year. The reduced-form probit selection results and estimated coeﬃcients of the wage
equations in 2007 are provided in Appendix sections 8.2.3 and 8.2.4.
8.2.1 Estimation procedure of wages
Consider the following wage function on a sample of working men and women:
logwi = Xiβ + µi,
where logwi is the logarithm of hourly wage, and X is a vector of characteristics such
as schooling, work experience, etc. It is argued, however, that the sample of employed
workers is not a random sample, and that this selectivity might bias the coeﬃcients.
Formally, we can write down a participation equation
Ei = 1 if Ziγ + εi ≥ 0,
Ei = 0 if Ziγ + εi < 0,
where Z includes variables that predict whether or not a person works. Therefore the
probability of an individual working is





ε is the variance of εi, and Φ(·) is cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal.
The selectivity problem is apparent by taking expectations of the wage function over
33the sample of employed workers:
E(logwi|Ei = 1,Xi) = Xiβ + E (µi|εi ≥ −Ziγ).
Supposing µi and εi are jointly normally distributed, let σµ,ε be the covariance be-
tween µi and εi. We can now write






where φ(·) is the standard normal density. When σµ,ε is not zero, selectivity bias occurs.






in the OLS regression as
logwi = Xiβ + αVi + ηi.
8.2.2 Deﬁnitions of variables in X and Z
Age Respondent’s age
Age2 Square of variable Age
HI Dummy variable: 1 if respondent is a high school dropout
HG Dummy variable: 1 if respondent is a high school graduate
SC Dummy variable: 1 if respondent has some college education
CG Dummy variable: 1 if respondent is a college graduate
Exp Respondent’s years of work experience
Exp2 Square of variable Exp
Black Dummy variable: 1 if respondent is black
Married Dummy variable: 1 if respondent is married
Nchild Number of own children in household
Nchlt5 Number of own children under age 5 in household
Northeast Dummy variable: 1 if household is located in Northeast region
Midwest Dummy variable: 1 if household is located in Midwest region
South Dummy variable: 1 if household is located in South region
West Dummy variable: 1 if household is located in West region
Metro Dummy variable: 1 if household is located in a metropolitan
Manager Dummy variable: 1 if respondent is a manager or professional
Whitecollar Dummy variable: 1 if respondent has white-collar occupation
other than those in management
Bluecollar Dummy variable: 1 if respondent has blue-collar occupation
V See Equation (22)
34Males Females
Variable Coeﬃcient t Coeﬃcient t
Constant -2.5929 -41.75 -2.6571 -43.10
HG 0.3134 15.67 0.5029 24.77
SC 0.3882 18.68 0.6520 32.05
CG 0.7044 31.09 0.8212 38.86
Age 0.1627 46.82 0.1448 41.89
Age2 -0.0022 -52.07 -0.0018 -44.29
Black -0.3328 -16.14 -0.0018 -0.10
Marry 0.4641 22.41 -0.0499 -2.91
Nchild 0.0396 4.82 -0.0800 -12.86
Nchlt5 0.0315 1.79 -0.2708 -22.21
No. of obs. 48,145 51,315
-2 ln(likelihood ratio) 8285.05 5252.96
χ2 degree of freedom 9 9
Table 3: Participation Selection Rules: Probit Analysis (CPS 2007)
8.2.3 Estimation results: probit selection
The reduced-form probit selection rule in equation (21) is estimated in each year for
men and women, respectively. We estimate these probits year by year because there are
some evidences that how individuals select themselves into the workforce have shifted
over time (Mulligan and Rubinstein 2007). Table 3 presents estimated coeﬃcients and
asymptotic t-statistics of the reduced form participation probit for 2007.27 Our ﬁndings
are generally in accord with previous research. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that educational
attainment has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the probability of par-
ticipation for both men and women. The probability of working increases in age at a
decreasing rate for both men and women. Black men are less likely to participate than
nonblacks. Men who are married or have children are more likely to participate than
other men, even though the eﬀect of number of children is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Married women and women with children are less likely to participate.
8.2.4 Estimation results: wage equations
Estimated coeﬃcients and asymptotic t-statistics of the wage equations in 2007 cor-
rected for selections are found in Table 4. Estimated coeﬃcients on education, expe-
rience, occupation dummies, race, and region dummies are similar to estimates from
the typical wage equations found in the literature. College education attainments are
generally more important for women’s wage than for men. Experience has more of a
positive impact on men’s wage than on women’s wage.
27Estimates for other years are available from the authors.
35Males Females
Variable Coeﬃcient t Coeﬃcient t
Constant 1.5958 29.79 1.4525 31.64
HG 0.3278 22.01 0.2822 13.43
SC 0.4650 28.34 0.4704 20.27
CG 0.7743 36.96 0.8072 31.61
exp 0.0462 19.04 0.0336 19.29
exp2 -0.0009 -13.81 -0.0006 -15.43
manager 0.3618 36.55 0.4974 38.16
white-collar 0.0099 1.09 0.1966 19.19
Midwest -0.0713 -6.83 -0.0746 -6.61
South -0.0829 -8.39 -0.0766 -7.09
West -0.0445 -4.38 -0.0453 -4.01
metro 0.1150 12.74 0.1476 15.27
black -0.1424 -9.38 -0.0298 -2.41
married 0.2748 16.84 0.0425 4.01
V 0.3131 5.08 0.2283 6.51
R2 0.3026 0.2362
Table 4: Estimates of wage equation (11): CPS 2007
Selectivity biases are particularly interesting. One would expect that individuals
with higher wage potential should be more likely to participate in the labor force. The
estimation results conﬁrm that individuals who expect to earn more are more likely to
participate in the labor force. The coeﬃcients of V (deﬁned in equation (22) in Appendix
8.2.1) are positive and statistically signiﬁcant for both men and women. Therefore,
observed wage patterns of men and women are higher than the population mean pattern
would have been.
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